A robust image encryption algorithm based on Chua's circuit and compressive sensing by Luo, Yuling et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A robust image encryption algorithm based on Chua's circuit and
compressive sensing
Citation for published version:
Luo, Y, Lin, J, Liu, J, Wei, D, Cao, L, Zhou, R, Cao, Y & Ding, X 2019, 'A robust image encryption algorithm
based on Chua's circuit and compressive sensing', Signal Processing, vol. 161, pp. 227-247.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sigpro.2019.03.022
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.sigpro.2019.03.022
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Signal Processing
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
1 
 
A robust image encryption algorithm based on Chua’s 
circuit and compressive sensing 
Yuling Luo1, Jia Lin1, Junxiu Liu1*, Duqu Wei1, Lvchen Cao2, Ronglong Zhou1, Yi Cao3, Xuemei Ding4,5 
1 School of Electronic Engineering, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, China, 541004 
2 School of Information and Electronics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China, 100081 
3 Management Science and Business Economics Group, Business School, 
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, EH8 9JS  
4 Faculty of Software, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China, 350108 
5 School of Computing, Engineering and Intelligent Systems,  
Ulster University, Northern Ireland, UK, BT48 7JL 
 
Abstract: In terms of Chua’s circuit system, compressive sensing (CS) and Haar wavelet, a novel image 
compression-encryption scheme (CES) is proposed in this paper. Firstly, the plaintext image is decomposed 
into approximate component and detail components through Haar wavelet. Then the approximate component 
is diffused by the threshold processing of local binary patterns (LBP) operator-based chaotic sequence which 
is produced by the combination of Chua’s circuit and Logistic map. Next, the Lissajous map is applied to 
generate the chaos-combined asymptotic deterministic random measurement matrices (CADRMM) which are 
employed to measure the detail components in different compression ratios. In addition, the combination of 
mapped approximate and detail components is shuffled by the Logistic map. The experimental results and 
simulation analysis prove that the proposed cryptosystem is capable of reducing data for transmission and has 
good security performance under various attacks, especially for the shear and noise attacks. 
Keywords: cryptosystem; compressive sensing; Chua’s circuit system; Haar wavelet; CADRMM 
1. Introduction 
 The flourishing development of the information industry has made the security of multimedia information 
become a major challenge [1]–[5], especially, image security is one of the most crucial problems in many 
application fields such as military, medical and commercial areas. Therefore, the design of image 
compression-encryption scheme (CES) has aroused more attention to effectively protect the image data during 
transmission and storage [6]–[10]. Even though traditional cryptographic approaches, such as Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), can protect the digital information well, the inherent 
characteristics of images are not considered, such as strong correlation between two adjacent pixels and 
redundancy, so that it makes the algorithms invalid to some extent [11]. As one alternative solution, the chaos-
based image cryptosystem is widely investigated recently [1]–[10]. Meanwhile, considering fast transmission 
and less storage resource, compressive sensing (CS) technology has been gradually applied to many image 
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encryption algorithms recently, with the aims at reducing the amount of data in different proportions [12]–
[20]. 
 Due to the good ergodicity, unpredictability, mixing property, and high sensitivity to initial keys and 
system parameters, the chaos becomes a good approach to construct the cryptosystem [21]–[27]. Former 
previous, some simple chaotic systems such as one-dimensional chaotic maps are widely proposed and applied 
[28]–[30]. However, one-dimensional chaotic maps may lead to weak key space and are vulnerable to 
known/chosen plaintext attack and brute-force attack is proved [31]. In contrast, large key space is able to 
bring favourable performance to resist brute-force attack and provide security of high level. Then 
multidimensional chaotic systems are applied in numerous image encryption method [30]–[33]. Especially, a 
coupled two-dimensional piecewise nonlinear chaotic map to replace the one-dimensional chaotic systems to 
design cryptosystem is introduced [32], where the combination of a masking process and external secret key 
with the length of 256-bit enables the scheme to have adequately large keys space and make the brute-force 
attack ineffective. Another image cryptosystem integrated with compression simultaneously [33], where the 
original image is shuffled by the 2-D hyperchaotic system is presented, and the Chinese remainder theorem is 
introduced to confuse and compress on disarranged image synchronously. In order to improve the degradation 
under limited precision, a method to constitute three different rules by 3-D chaotic Cat map to judge the 
procedure of shuffle, scrambling and mixing of every pixel is proposed [34]. Moreover, for strengthening the 
encryption scenario security, several hyper-chaotic systems are introduced, e.g. a hyperchaotic image 
cryptography on the basis of a pixel-permutation and bit-confusion mechanism is put forward [35], which can 
overcome the common weaknesses of the algorithm by using low-dimensional chaotic map. Besides, 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) encoding technique is also widely introduced in chaos-based image 
cryptosystem [36]–[39]. For example, an algorithm where the pixels are thoroughly scrambled via addition 
and complement is introduced [36]. In [39], an original image is transformed into a DNA matrix, wave-based 
permutation and row-by-row diffusion operations are performed on it, and it is combined with chaotic system 
and SHA-256 hash function. In addition, image encryption is not only limited to pixel level operation but also 
extends to decompose an image into binary bit-plane by using a specific decomposition method. A novel color 
image cryptosystem by permutating every bit data and employing high-dimensional chaotic map is introduced 
[40]. To enhance the sensitivity to plain-text to make the chosen plaintext attack vulnerable, a novel bit-level 
image cryptosystem on the basis of the cyclic shift and swapping operation is presented [41].  
 In the meantime, considering the convenience and security of data storage and transmission, the 
compressive sensing (CS) theory is simultaneously introduced to image cryptosystem [42]–[47]. There are 
two types of measurements matrices that can be used in compressive sensing. The first method is to take the 
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entire measurement matrix as the key that should be transmitted to result in much space required in the process 
[48]–[50]. However, due to the chaos maps can also dominate the property of measurement matrix, the second 
method of producing the measurement matrix by chaos map is more suitable for image encryption. The space 
of the keys to recover the plain image will be greatly reduced compared to use the entire measurement matrix 
as the keys. A CES which uses the partial Hadamard matrix to produce measurement matrix of CS is proposed 
[51]. Besides, 2-D CS and nonlinear fractional Mellin transform are introduced to construct the image CES 
[52], in which, the measurement matrices which are controlled by a chaotic map is applied to measure the 
original image from different directions and then the measured result is re-encrypted via nonlinear fractional 
Mellin transform. Moreover, another CES which the order of the atoms in the discrete cosine transform (DCT) 
dictionary is scrambled by the logistic map is proposed [53], and the analysis sparse representation of the 
original image can be obtained with the atom scrambled dictionary and considered as an encrypted version. 
Analysis results show that it is capable of withstanding noise quite well, while the simulation results of the 
algorithm need to be further improved under the shear attack. Besides, a mechanism to embed the encrypted 
image into a carrier image is introduced [54], in which the zigzag path is found to confuse the wavelet 
coefficients of the plaintext image after wavelet transform. After the compressing by using the CS, the 
encrypted image is finally obtained. Then the carrier image is acquired by embedding the encrypted image 
into it. This method can achieve dual security of image information and image appearance. The size of the 
encrypted image equals to the size of the plain image, i.e. no additional memory space is required. 
 In order to improve the security of the CES, a novel and robust image CES by using Chua’s circuit and 
CS is proposed in this paper. If the CS theory is directly applied to the plain-image, it will be difficult to 
recognize the reconstruction image when the cipher images suffer malicious shear attack and noise attack in 
the transport channel. Therefore, the following procedures have been proposed to eliminate this defect. Firstly, 
the plain image is decomposed into approximate component and detail components by discrete wavelet 
transform (DWT) in this work. The approximate component contains the main information of the image, and 
the security of this component should be enhanced. Secondly, the corresponding approximate component is 
mapped to 8-bit integer values. As for the diffusion of the approximate component, the threshold processing 
of local binary patterns (LBP) operator-based permutation is employed to scramble the chaotic sequence which 
is produced by Chua’s circuit. Besides, considered the high space consumption of random measurement 
matrices, the decision of the measurement matrix is depended on the second method in our proposed algorithm. 
Hence, the remaining detailed components are measured by chaos-combined asymptotic deterministic random 
measurement matrices (CADRMM) generated by the Lissajous map. The main contributions of this paper are 
briefly summarized as follows. (1) A modified measurement matrix CADRMM is developed. (2) A new 
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method for generating diffusion matrix is introduced. (3) Based on the Chua’s circuit, Lissajous map, logistic 
map and compressive sensing, a robust compression-encryption image cryptosystem is designed. (4) The 
robustness of the scheme is improved to be capable to defend the shear and noise attacks. (5) The performance 
simulation and security analysis of this system are displayed. 
 The rest part of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides basic knowledge of chaotic maps, 
compressive sensing, Lissajous map and the threshold processing of LBP operator. The CADRMM and a new 
method of generating diffusion matrix are also given in detail. Section 3 gives the structure of encryption 
method, and the corresponding decryption process is briefly involved. Section 4 reports experimental 
simulations and analysis of the security performance. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Fundamental knowledge 
2.1. Two chaotic maps 
2.1.1. Logistic map 
 The Logistic map is defined by 
 𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝜇𝑥𝑛(1 − 𝑥𝑛), (1) 
where 𝑥𝑛 represents the state value after the iterations of 𝑛 times and 𝑥𝑛 ∈ (0,1), and 𝑥𝑛+1 represents the 
next iteration value of 𝑥𝑛. The system has chaotic behaviours when the control parameter 𝜇 ∈ [3.57,4]. As 
its small computation cost and good chaotic behaviour, the Logistic map is frequently used in image 
cryptosystem [6][22][28][55]. 
2.1.2. Chua’s circuit 
 Chua’s circuit [56] represents the nonlinear electronic circuit system, and has several excellent properties, 
e.g. complex dynamical characteristics, outstanding pseudorandom, unpredictability and sufficient key spaces 
[57], [58]. It is defined by 
 {
?̇? = 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑥 − 𝑓(𝑥)) ;
?̇? = 𝑥 − 𝑦 + 𝑧 ;
?̇? = −𝛽𝑦 ,
 (2) 
where function 𝑓(𝑥)  represents the electrical response of the nonlinear resistor, which is described as 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑏𝑥 + (𝑎 − 𝑏)(|𝑥 + 1| − |𝑥 − 1|)/2 , where 𝑎  and 𝑏  denote the slope of the inner and outer 
segments of the piecewise-linear function, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are determined by the specific values of the circuit 
elements, the state variables 𝑥, 𝑦 correspond to the voltage on capacitors, and 𝑧 indicates the current on 
inductor. With the increase of 𝛼 , the system produces a series of asymmetrical bifurcation lines, which 
gradually form two asymmetrical attractors, i.e., a double vortex chaos attractor. This system includes four 
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linear elements (two capacitors, one inductor and one resistor) and one nonlinear resistor (Chua’s diode), 
which can be constructed by off-the-shelf opamps. The double vortex chaos attractor appears when 𝛼 = 10.0, 
𝛽 = 15.68 , 𝑎 = −1.2768 , 𝑏 = −0.6888  with the parameters of 𝑥 = 0.1 , 𝑦 = 0.1  and 𝑧 = 0.1 . The 
attractors are displayed in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Attractors of Chua’s circuit system. (a) in x and y plane, (b) in x and z plane, (c) in y and z plane, (d) in 𝑥, y 
and z space. 
2.2. Compressive sensing 
 Compressive sensing (CS) [59] has ability to sample and compress synchronously, the sample needed in 
the reconstruction processing is much fewer than Nyquist sampling theorem. To ensure the signal can be 
successfully recovered, the following preparation steps should be applied on the original signals. 
 Firstly, for signal 𝒙 with dimensions of 𝑁 × 1, 𝒙ϵ 𝑅𝑁, it is sparse in some transform domains such as 
DCT and DWT. It can be represented in those sparse domains, i.e., 
 𝒙 = ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖 = 𝛙𝐬, (3) 
where 𝜓𝑖 is each column orthonormal basis of an 𝑁 ×𝑁 orthogonal transform matrix 𝛙 , 𝐬 represents 
𝑁 × 1 sparse coefficient vector. It is a K-sparse when K entries of 𝐬 are non-zero. 
 Secondly, a measurement matrix is also needed in the whole sampling and compressing process, which is 
described by 
 𝒚 = ϕ𝒙 = ϕ𝛙s = Θs, (4) 
where ϕ is a measurement matrix with the size of 𝑀 ×𝑁 (𝑀 < 𝑁 ) and 𝑀 = 𝑁/𝑟 , 𝑟 represents the 
compression ratio, Θ indicates the product of ϕ and 𝛙, which is the sensing matrix. In order to recover the 
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signal 𝒙 from measurement value 𝒚, the sensing matrix Θ need to meet the condition of restricted isometry 
property (RIP) which can retain the approximate Euclidean distance of 𝑘 sparse signal. When 𝑘 sparse 
signal is not in the null space of Θ, it is guaranteed that the signal 𝒙 can be recovered successfully. The 
conditions are concluded by: 
 (1 − 𝛿𝑘)‖s‖2
2 ≤ ‖ϕs‖2
2 ≤ (1 + 𝛿𝑘)‖s‖2
2, (5) 
where the 𝛿𝑘 is the isometry constant, and ϕ should be highly incoherent with 𝛙. Measurement matrix 
usually includes Partial Hadamard random matrix, circulant random matrix and Gaussian random matrix etc., 
Non-convex optimization problem is employed to estimate original signal 𝒙, the process of solving the sparse 
estimation is 
 min‖s‖0   s.t   y = ϕ𝛙𝐬, (6) 
where ‖s‖0 represents the 𝑙0-norm of vector 𝐬. Solving this problem is a NP-hard problem. Then, solving 
𝑙1-norm optimization problem instead can overcome it, which is described by 
 min‖s‖1    s.t     y = ϕ𝛙𝐬. (7) 
 In general, some common methods of recovering 𝒙 from y have been proposed, for instance, orthogonal 
matching pursuit (OMP) [60], subspace pursuit (SP) [61], basis pursuit (BP) [62], compressive sampling 
matching pursuit (CoSaMP) [63] etc. 
2.3. Lissajous map 
 Lissajous map illustrates that the return map of the nonlinear dynamical system is a perfect Lissajous 
curve [64]. The nonlinear dynamical system is given by 
 𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑓
−1(𝑥𝑛)), (8) 
 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑏𝑓
−1(𝑥𝑛)), (9) 
where 𝑎 = 𝑝/𝑞 > 2 is a relative prime fraction number, 𝑝, 𝑞 are relative prime numbers, 𝑏 = 𝑞𝑁 is on 
the condition of 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑖𝑛2(𝑡), 𝑐𝑜𝑠2(𝑡), 𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝑡) or 𝑏 = 2(𝑝𝑞)𝑁 when 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑖𝑛 (𝑡), 𝑁 denotes that 
the asymptotic deterministic randomness theory can not be predicted in 𝑁 steps. In this paper, 𝑓(𝑡) is 
taken as 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑖𝑛 (𝑡), and the nonlinear dynamical system is defined by 
 𝑥𝑛+1 = sin(𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛
−1(𝑥𝑛)), (10) 
 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑛
−1(𝑥𝑛)). (11) 
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2.4. Chaos-combined asymptotic deterministic random measurement matrix (CADRMM) 
 The design of measurements matrix is the kernel of the signal sampling’s quality and it affects whether 
the signal could be easily sampled by hardware or not. Using random measurement matrix may lead to large 
space consumption during transmission and storage. Due to the defects mentioned above, Lissajous map in 
section 2.3 is used to generate a sequence with asymptotic deterministic randomness. Then, the asymptotic 
deterministic random sequence constructs the measurement matrix in CS. According to Eqs. (10)-(11), 
considering that the relative prime fraction number 𝑎 in original theory is constant, that is to say, 𝑝 and 𝑞 
are fixed parameters. In the case of the asymptotic deterministic random sequence meet the conditions of 
compressive sensing, Logistic map is introduced to improve the variability of the sequence. The generation of 
measurement matrix includes the following steps and Fig. 2 is an example of the generation of CADRMM. 
 
Fig. 2. An example of CADRMM. 
Step 1. Two prime number sequences 𝜼 = [𝜂1 , 𝜂2 , … , 𝜂𝑀×𝑁] and 𝝋 = [𝜑1, 𝜑2 , … , 𝜑𝑀×𝑁] are listed 
in successive order to ensure 𝑝 and 𝑞 are co-prime in the aforesaid system, 𝜼 represents numerators and 
𝝋 is the corresponding denominators, and 𝜂𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 2𝜑𝑚𝑎𝑥 should be guaranteed, where 𝜂𝑚𝑖𝑛 is described 
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as the minimum value of 𝜼, 𝜑𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum value in sequence 𝝋. 
Step 2. Suppose the size of the plain image is 𝑀1 × 𝑁1. After applying DWT on it, the image is divided 
into four subbands including low frequency partial decomposition coefficient (LL), horizontal direction 
decomposition coefficient (𝐿𝐻), vertical direction decomposition coefficient (𝐻𝐿) and diagonal direction 
decomposition coefficient (𝐻𝐻). The size of each subbband is 
𝑀1
2
×
𝑁1
2
. Two chaotic sequences 𝒔𝟎 and 𝒔𝟏 
with length of 
𝑀1×𝑁1
2𝑟1
 and 
𝑀1×𝑁1
2𝑟2
 are generated by Logistic map at first, where 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 are the various 
compression ratios for compressing different component, respectively. The initial parameters of Logistic map 
are 𝑥02 and 𝑎02. Sort 𝒔𝟎 and 𝒔𝟏 with descending order after abandoning the foregoing 
𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
 and 
𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟2
 
elements, then obtain two index sequences 𝒕′and 𝒕′′, and they are denoted by 
 𝒕′ = [𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
+1
′ , 𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
+2
′ , … , 𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
2𝑟1
′ ], (12) 
 𝒕′′ = [𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟2
+1
′′ , 𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟2
+2
′′ , … , 𝑡𝑀1×𝑁1
2𝑟2
′′ ]. (13) 
Step 3. Select the numerator 𝜼(𝒕′) from sequence 𝜼 one by one, 𝜼(𝒕′) is the (𝑡′)𝑡ℎ value of 𝜼 and 
then choose denominator 𝝋(𝒓𝒕′) from sequence 𝝋, 𝝋(𝒓𝒕′) is the (𝑀 × 𝑁 − 𝑡′)𝑡ℎ value of 𝝋. Because 
the choices of 𝑝 and 𝑞 are determined by the chaotic system, the corresponding parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 are 
not fixed in each iteration. Even if the initial value in Eq. (10) and (11) is known, the right measurement matrix 
cannot been obtained without the correct coefficient sequences of 𝒂 and 𝒃. Compared to use the fixed 𝑎 
and 𝑏 values in the original equation, the advantage of this process is that the randomness of the measurement 
matrix can be enhanced. After that, define the numerator sequence as 𝒑 = [𝑝1, 𝑝2… , 𝑝𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
]  and 
denominator sequence as 𝒒 = [𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
]. Therefore, the coefficients 𝒂 = [
𝑝1
𝑞1
,
𝑝2
𝑞2
, … ,
𝑝𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
𝑞𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
] in Eq. 
(8) are obtained. Then calculate the other coefficients 𝐛 = [2(𝑝1𝑞1)
𝑁 , 2(𝑝2𝑞2)
𝑁, … 2(
𝑝𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
𝑞𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
)𝑁], where 𝑁 
denotes that the asymptotic deterministic randomness theory can not be predicted in 𝑁 steps. The chaos-
combined asymptotic deterministic random sequence 𝒌 = [𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
] for detail components 𝐿𝐻 
and 𝐻𝐻 is produced by iterating the Eq. (10) and (11) for 
𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1
 times with initial value 𝑥05 generated by 
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SHA-256. Similarly, 𝒌′ = [𝑘1
′ , 𝑘2
′ , … , 𝑘𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟2
′ ]  for 𝐻𝐿  component is generated by operating the same 
process. 
Step 4. Transform the two chaos-combined asymptotic deterministic random sequence 𝒌 and 𝒌′ into 
two measurement matrices by 
 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑘1 … 𝑘𝑁1
2
𝑘𝑁1
2
+1
… 𝑘𝑁1
… … …
𝑘
(
𝑀1
2𝑟1
−1)×
𝑁1
2
+1
… 𝑘𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟1 ]
 
 
 
 
, (14) 
 𝚽𝑯𝑳 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑘1
′ … 𝑘𝑁1
2
′
𝑘𝑁1
2
+1
′ … 𝑘𝑁1
′
… … …
𝑘
(
𝑀1
2𝑟2
−1)×
𝑁1
2
+1
′ … 𝑘𝑀1×𝑁1
4𝑟2
′
]
 
 
 
 
 
. (15) 
where 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯  is the measurement matrix for 𝐿𝐻  and 𝐻𝐻  component, and 𝚽𝑯𝑳 represents the 
measurement matrix for 𝐻𝐿 component. 
2.5. Threshold processing of LBP operator 
 The LBP is an operator in the field of digital image processing which can be used to represent local texture 
characteristics of an image originally. In this work, it is combined with Chua’s circuit to produce chaotic mask 
to diffuse approximate component. The original LBP operator is defined in the window of 3×3, where the 
window sets the center pixel as the threshold. If the eight neighbours of the pixel are larger than the threshold, 
it is marked as 1, otherwise 0 is instead. Through this method, every 8-bit binary number is generated by one 
threshold. Fig. 3 describes the transform process in detail. 
 
Fig. 3. The example for threshold processing of LBP operator-based transform process. 
2.6. A novel method to generate the diffusion matrix 
 For a chaotic matrix 𝐓 ∈ 𝑅𝑀1×𝑁1 generated by Chua’s circuit, it can be further scrambled and diffused 
to get the diffusion matrix by the following steps, 
10 
 
Step 1. Compare each value in matrix 𝐓 with its 8-adjacent areas. For example, if 𝐓𝑖,𝑗 is the comparison 
object, 𝐓𝑖,𝑗 should be compared with the value 𝐓𝑖−1,𝑗−1, 𝐓𝑖−1,𝑗, 𝐓𝑖−1,𝑗+1, 𝐓𝑖,𝑗−1, 𝐓𝑖,𝑗+1, 𝐓𝑖+1,𝑗−1, 𝐓𝑖+1,𝑗 
and 𝐓𝑖+1,𝑗+1 in eight directions around it, where 𝐓𝑖,𝑗 represents the value in row 𝑖 and column 𝑗. Similarly, 
each value in this entire matrix 𝐓 should be traversed by the comparison approach mentioned in section 2.5. 
Step 2. Suppose that 𝐓𝑖−1,𝑗−1 is larger than 𝐓𝑖,𝑗 , then 𝐓𝑖−1,𝑗−1 is marked as 1 otherwise mark as 0 
instead. Consequently, a matrix 𝐓′ composed of 0 and 1 is produced and turn 𝐓′ ∈ 𝑅8𝑀1×𝑁1 into 𝐓′′ ∈
𝑅1×8𝑀1𝑁1 with the aim to facilitate the follow-up scrambling operation on it. 
Step 3. Iterate the Logistic map with initial conditions 𝑥03 and 𝑎03 to get chaotic sequence and then 
sort it in ascend order to obtain the index sequence 𝒒 = [𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑖, … , 𝑞8𝑀1×𝑁1], where 𝑞𝑖 indicates the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ element in 𝒒. Then the sequence 𝒒 is used to disturb 𝐓′′ in the terms of, 
 𝐓′′′(1, 𝑖) = 𝐓′′(1, 𝑞𝑖), 𝑖=1, 2, …, 8𝑀1 ×𝑁1 (16) 
where 𝑞𝑖 represents the sequential index of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ number in sequence 𝒒, and 𝐓′′′ ∈ 𝑅1×8𝑀1𝑁1 in which 
there will be a better randomness between each two adjacent binary elements. Specifically, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ element 
𝐓′′′(1, 𝑖) of the sequence 𝐓′′′ is substituted by the 𝑞𝑖
𝑡ℎ value of sequence 𝐓′′, where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,  8𝑀1 ×
𝑁1. The length of the sequences 𝐓
′′ and 𝐓′′′ is  8𝑀1 × 𝑁1. 
Step 4. Transform every 8 elements in 𝐓′′′ to a value which ranges from 0 to 255 by 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝐓1+8 (𝑖−1)
′′′ × 27 + 𝐓2+8 (𝑖−1)
′′′ × 26 + 𝐓3+8(𝑖−1)
′′′ × 25 + 𝐓4+8((𝑖−1)
′′′ × 24 + 𝐓5+8(𝑖−1)
′′′ × 23 + 𝐓6+8 (𝑖−1)
′′′ ×
22 + 𝐓7+8(𝑖−1)
′′′ × 21 + 𝐓8+8(𝑖−1)
′′′ × 20 (17) 
where 𝑓𝑖 indicates the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ value of matrix 𝒇, 𝐓𝑎
′′′ is the 𝑎𝑡ℎ value of matrix 𝐓′′′. The diffusion matrix 
𝒇′ ∈ 𝑅𝑀1×𝑁1 is constructed by rearranging 𝒇 ∈ 𝑅8𝑀1×𝑁1. 
3. The proposed compression-encryption procedure 
 The proposed image CES is put forward based on gray image, and the complete working flow chart is 
described in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. The proposed compression-encryption procedure. 
In this proposed algorithm, the measurement matrix CADRMM is mainly generated by Lissajous map 
and the logistic map, therefore, only several parameters are needed during transmission or storage. With the 
correct secret keys, the reconstruction of recovered image can be accomplished successfully. Compared with 
the method of transmitting the whole random measurement matrix in [49], the space consumption problem 
can be solved by this proposed CDARMM. Besides, the proposed algorithm has strong robustness against 
noise attack and occlusion attack. The complete process of this image CES can be described in the following 
steps. 
Step 1. Firstly, based on the original image information, SHA-256 is applied to produce the keys 
𝑦01, 𝑦02, 𝑦03 of the Chua’s circuit and 𝑥05 of CADRMM. Specifically, the final hash value generated by 
SHA-256 can be denoted as = 𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3… , 𝑘32  (𝑘𝑖 = {𝑘0
𝑖 , 𝑘1
𝑖 , 𝑘2
𝑖 , … , 𝑘7
𝑖 }  where for each 𝑘𝑗
𝑖 , 𝑖  is the 
character number and 𝑗 represnets the 𝑗𝑡ℎ bit in 𝑘𝑖 ). The keys for Chua’s circuit and CADRMM are 
obtained by 
 
{
 
 
 
 𝑦01 =
1
256
(𝑘1⊕𝑘8⊕𝑘2⊕𝑘7 + 𝑘3⊕𝑘6⊕𝑘4⊕𝑘5)
𝑦02 =
1
256
(𝑘9⊕𝑘16⊕𝑘10⊕𝑘15 + 𝑘11⊕𝑘14⊕𝑘12⊕𝑘13)
𝑦03 =
1
256
(𝑘17⊕𝑘24⊕𝑘18⊕𝑘23 + 𝑘19⊕𝑘22⊕𝑘20⊕𝑘21)
𝑥05 =
1
256
(𝑘25⊕𝑘32⊕𝑘26⊕𝑘31 + 𝑘27⊕𝑘30⊕𝑘28⊕𝑘29)
 (18) 
where ⊕ is the bitxor operation. Due to the strongly sensitivity to the plain image for SHA-256, so the tiny 
change of original image will bring out completely different secret keys. 
Step 2. Suppose the dimension of the original image 𝐼 is 𝑀 ×𝑁 , and it is decomposed into low 
frequency partial coefficient 𝐿𝐿, detail components 𝐿𝐻, 𝐻𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻 by DWT. The size of these subbands 
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𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐻, 𝐻𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻 is 𝑀1 × 𝑁1. 
 Step 3. Iterate Chua’s circuit 𝑀1 × 𝑁1/3 times with the initial values 𝑦01, 𝑦02 and 𝑦03 which are 
generated by SHA-256 and the 𝑦01, 𝑦02 and 𝑦03 correspond to parameters 𝑥 , 𝑦 , 𝑧 and α = −1.2768 , 
β = −0.6888, 𝑎 = −1.2768, 𝑏 = −0.6888 in Eq. (2), respectively. The length of sequences 𝑙1, 𝑙2 and 𝑙3 
is 𝑀1 × 𝑁1/3. Then integrate these three sequences into a chaotic sequence |𝑙4| ∈ 𝑅
1×𝑀1𝑁1, where |𝑎| is 
the absolute value of 𝑎. To reduce the correlation between adjacent values of the |𝑙4|, the logistic map with 
initial conditions 𝑥01 and 𝑎01 is employed to generate another chaotic sequence 𝒒 = [𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑀1×𝑁1]. 
Then ergodic rearrangement is applied by sorting the sequence in an ascend order to obtain the index sequence 
𝒔 = [𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑀1×𝑁1]. After that, |𝑙4| is scrambled according to sequence 𝒔 and the permutated chaotic 
sequence is denoted as |𝑙4|
′. 
 Step 4. To transform |𝑙4|
′ into integer sequence 𝒛 = [𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑀1×𝑁1] and enhance the difference 
intensity between every two adjacent values, the corresponding calculation is taken as 
 𝑧𝑖 = ⌊|𝑙4|𝑖
′ × 1016mod 256⌋ (19) 
where ⌊𝑎⌋  indicates the nearest integer smaller than 𝑎 , 𝑖  is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  value in the sequence, and then 
transform 𝒛 into matrix 𝒛′ by using 
 𝒛′ = [
𝑧1 … 𝑧𝑁1
𝑧𝑁1+1 … 𝑧2𝑁1
… … …
𝑧(𝑀1−1)𝑁1+1 … 𝑧𝑀1×𝑁1
]. (20) 
Step 5. According to section 2.4, the initial parameters 𝑥02, 𝑎02 are used to produce chaotic sequences 
𝒕′and 𝒕′′. Both of them are used to choose numerators from 𝜼 and denominators from 𝝋 for parameters 𝑎 
and 𝑏 in Eq. (10) and (11), respectively. The measurement matrix 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯 is generated by iterating Eq. (10) 
and (11) 𝑀1 ×𝑁1/𝑟1 times with initial value 𝑥05, and it is used to measure 𝐿𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻 with compression 
ratio 𝑟1 = 4. Similarly, do 𝑀1 × 𝑁1/𝑟2 times iteration to bring out 𝚽𝑯𝑳  to measure 𝐻𝐿 with compression 
ratio 𝑟2 = 2. 
Step 6. Extend 𝐿𝐻 , 𝐻𝐿 and 𝐻𝐻 components in 𝛹 domain to obtain 𝛼𝐿𝐻 , 𝛼𝐻𝐿 and 𝛼𝐻𝐻 . Apply 
𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯 to measure 𝛼𝐿𝐻, and 𝛼𝐻𝐻. Meanwhile, measure 𝛼𝐻𝐿 by 𝚽𝑯𝑳. The measured results are described 
by 
 𝑦𝐿𝐻 = 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯𝛼𝐿𝐻 = 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯𝛹
𝑇𝐿𝐻; (21) 
 𝑦𝐻𝐻 = 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯𝛹
𝑇𝐻𝐻; (22) 
 𝑦𝐻𝐿 = 𝚽𝑯𝑳𝛼𝐻𝐿 = 𝚽𝑯𝑳𝛹
𝑇𝐻𝐿, (23) 
13 
 
where 𝑦𝐿𝐻 ∈ 𝑅
𝑀1×𝑁1/𝑟1, 𝑦𝐻𝐻 ∈ 𝑅
𝑀1×𝑁1/𝑟1 and 𝑦𝐻𝐿 ∈ 𝑅
𝑀1×𝑁1/𝑟2. 
 Then transform the measured results into 8-bit integers using 
 𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑖,𝑗
′ = round [255 × (𝑦𝐿𝐻i,j − 𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛) /(𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛)] (24) 
 𝑦𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑗
′ = round [255 × (𝑦𝐻𝐻i,j − 𝑦𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛) /(𝑦𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑦𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛)] (25) 
 𝑦𝐻𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′ = round [255 × (𝑦𝐻𝐿i,j − 𝑦𝐻𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛) /(𝑦𝐻𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑦𝐻𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛)] (26) 
where round [𝑎] is the rounding operation, 𝑦𝐿𝐻i,j indicates the value of row 𝑖 and column 𝑗 in 𝑦𝐿𝐻 , 
𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum value of 𝑦𝐿𝐻 and 𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum value of 𝑦𝐿𝐻, 𝑦𝐿𝐻𝑖,𝑗
′  denotes the matrix 
after mapping. Similarly, 𝑦𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑗
′  and 𝑦𝐻𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′  are produced by the same process. 
 Step 7. According to section 2.6, 𝑥03 and 𝑎03 are served as the secret keys in Logistic map. A novel 
method is applied to rearrange the chaotic matrix 𝒛′  and an integer diffusion matrix 𝒇′ ∈ 𝑅𝑀1×𝑁1  is 
constructed. 
 Step 8. Due to that the 𝐿𝐿 component is composed of wavelet coefficients, map 𝐿𝐿 to 0 to 255 by  
 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′ = round[255 × (𝐿𝐿i,j − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛)/(𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛)], (27) 
where round [𝑎] is the rounding operation, 𝐿𝐿i,j indicates the value of row 𝑖 and column 𝑗 in 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 
is the minimum value of 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum value of 𝐿𝐿, in addition, 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′  denotes the matrix 
after mapping. 
 Step 9. Diffuse the 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′  by XOR operation by 
 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′′ = 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′ ⨁𝒇𝑖,𝑗
′  (28) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′  indicates the value of row 𝑖 and column 𝑗 in 𝐿𝐿′ , 𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗
′′  indicates the value of row 𝑖 and 
column 𝑗 in 𝐿𝐿′′, 𝒇𝑖,𝑗
′  denotes the value of row 𝑖 and column 𝑗 in 𝒇′, and ⨁ denotes bitxor operation. 
 Step 10. Construct a new matrix 𝐏 with 𝑦𝐿𝐻
′  𝑦𝐻𝐻
′ , 𝑦𝐻𝐿
′  and 𝐿𝐿′′, and the size of 𝐏 is 𝑀1 ×𝑁. In this 
proposed scheme, 𝐿𝐿′′  is located in 𝐏(: , 1: 𝑁1) , and 𝐏(1:𝑀1 ×𝑁1 ∕ 𝑟1, 𝑁1 + 1:𝑁)  is 𝑦𝐿𝐻
′  , where 
𝐏(: , 1: 𝑁1) denotes the 1
𝑠𝑡 to 𝑁1
𝑡ℎ column vector of 𝐏. Then locate 𝑦𝐻𝐻
′  in the position of 𝐏(𝑀1 ×𝑁1 ∕
𝑟1 + 1: 2𝑀1 ×𝑁1 ∕ 𝑟1, 𝑁1 + 1:𝑁) , and place 𝑦𝐻𝐿
′   in 𝐏(2𝑀1 × 𝑁1 ∕ 𝑟1 + 1:𝑀1, 𝑁1 + 1:𝑁) . Here, we 
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assume that the compression ratio 𝑟1 of 𝐿𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻 equals to 4 and the compression ratio 𝑟2 of 𝐻𝐿 is 2. 
Fig. 5 shows the image after combination. 
LL″ 
 
Fig. 5. The result 𝐏 after combination. 
Step 11. Finally, iterate Logistic map with the initial parameters 𝑥04 = 𝑥04
′ + 𝑥02/100 + 𝑥05 ∕ 100 and 
𝑎04 = 𝑎04
′ + 𝑎02/100 , where 𝑥04
′ ∈ (0, 0.5]  and 𝑎04
′ ∈ [3.57, 3.959] . Sort the sequence 𝒒′ =
[𝑞1
′ , 𝑞2
′ , … , 𝑞𝑀1×𝑁
′ ] in descending order and get the index sequence 𝒔′ = [𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑀1×𝑁
′ ]. Disturb the matrix 
𝐏 by 𝒔′ and the final encrypted image 𝐄 is constructed. 
In relevant decryption process, the encrypted result of the plain image is permutated in an inverse order, 
and the detail components 𝐿𝐻 , 𝐻𝐿  and 𝐻𝐻  are recovered by Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) 
algorithm. Approximate component 𝐿𝐿 is transformed to wavelet domain through inverse mapping. Then 
employ inverse discrete wavelet transform (IDWT) to recover the entire original image. 
4. Experimental simulation and security analysis 
 The simulation results of the proposed CES are evaluated in the PC platform with 8GB RAM, a 3.7 GHz 
Core processor, and Intel(R) HD Graphics 530. Experimental results are provided in this section. 
4.1 The cipher images and decrypted images 
 Test images of “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”, “House” and “Lake” with the size of 512×512 are 
shown in Fig. 6(a), (d), (g), (j) and (m), and that with the size of 256×256 are displayed in Fig. 7(a), (d), (g), 
(j) and (m). The parameters in the test are shown in Table 1. The approximate component and three sets of 
detail components are transformed into a 256× 512 image. The cipher “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”, 
“House” and “Lake” with the size of 256× 512 are shown by Fig. 6(b), (e), (h), (k) and (n). Without 
interference signal, Fig. 6(c), (f), (i), (l) and (o) display the decrypted image “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”, 
“House” and “Lake” with the correct secret keys, respectively. Similarly, the encrypted and decrypted results 
of the same test images (256×256) are shown in Fig. 7. The simulation results show that the size of cipher 
images is reduced by 50% and the recovered images after decryption look the same as the plain images visually. 
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Table 1. Test parameters. 
Items Parameter values 
256-bit hash value (denoted in 
hexadecimal form) 
B 6 8 A 4 1 6 0 2 7 0 0 1 8 3 7 0 1 9 1 7 9 3 7 A 5 8 
1 E F D 6 9 D C 8 7 A F D 3 4 6 5 5 D 9 2 9 4 4 0 4 8 
E 6 5 9 4 9 8 4 6 7 
Logistic map 𝑥01 = 0.78, 𝑎01 = 3.98; 𝑥02 = 0.84, 𝑎02 = 3.99 
𝑥03 = 0.54, 𝑎03 = 3.96; 𝑥04 = 0.38 +
𝑥02
100
+
𝑥05
100
, 𝑎04 = 3.89 +
𝑎02
100
 
 
16 
 
 
Fig. 6. Plain images (512×512) and the results of cipher images (256×512). (a), (b), (c) represent the original, cipher 
and decrypted images of “Lena”, respectively. (d), (e), (f) represent the original, cipher and decrypted images of 
“Cameraman”, respectively. (g), (h), (i) are the original, cipher and decrypted images of “Peppers”, respectively. (j), 
(k), (l) are the original, cipher and decrypted images of “House”, respectively. (m), (n), (o) are the original, cipher and 
decrypted images of “Lake”, respectively. 
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Fig. 7. Plain images (256×256) and the results of cipher images (128×256). (a), (b), (c) represent the original, cipher 
and decrypted images of “Lena”, respectively. (d), (e), (f) represent the original, cipher and decrypted images of 
“Cameraman”, respectively. (g), (h), (i) are the original, cipher and decrypted images of “Peppers”, respectively. (j), 
(k), (l) are the original, cipher and decrypted images of “House”, respectively. (m), (n), (o) are the original, cipher and 
decrypted images of “Lake”, respectively. 
4.2 Histogram analysis 
 Histogram distribution of encrypted result is one of the basic criteria to evaluate the security and 
effectiveness of the cryptosystem. In general, although the histograms of the test images are totally dissimilar, 
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the corresponding encrypted images should present similar histogram distributions[51]–[53][65]. Fig. 8(a), 
(c), (e), (g) and (i) display the histograms of the original images “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”. “House” 
and “Lake” with the size of 512×512. Fig. 8(b), (d), (f), (h) and (j) are the histograms distribution of the 
corresponding cipher images. Similarly, histogram analysis is also applied on the same test with the size of 
256× 256. Fig. 9(a), (c), (e), (g) and (i) are the histograms of original “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”. 
“House” and “Lake” with the size of 256×256, and the histograms of respective encrypted images are shown 
in Fig. 9(b), (d), (f), (h) and (j). As shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, the histograms distribution of three original 
images are quite diverse but their corresponding cipher images histograms are almost similar regardless of the 
image size. Therefore, the CES is capable of resisting the basic statistical analysis attack and preventing the 
attackers from getting the useful information by analysing the histogram distribution. 
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Fig. 8. Histograms of the different plain images (512×512) and encrypted images (256×512). (a) “Lena”, (b) 
encrypted “Lena”, (c) “Cameraman”, (d) encrypted “Cameraman”, (e) “Peppers”, (f) encrypted “Peppers”, (e) 
“House”, (f) encrypted “House”, (e) “Lake”, (f) encrypted “Lake”. 
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Fig. 9. Histograms of the different plain images (256×256) and encrypted images (128×256). (a) “Lena”, (b) 
encrypted “Lena”, (c) “Cameraman”, (d) encrypted “Cameraman”, (e) “Peppers”, (f) encrypted “Peppers”, (e) 
“House”, (f) encrypted “House”, (e) “Lake”, (f) encrypted “Lake”. 
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4.3 Compression performance 
As for this CES architecture, CS is only used on the detail components of the wavelet domain. So the 
cipher data can be reduced, i.e., compression ratio (CR) of this CES is 0.5. Moreover, the peak signal-to-noise 
ratio (PSNR) is usually employed to estimate the quality of the decrypted image, and it can be calculated by 
 PSNR = 10log
2552
(1/N2)∑ ∑ [D(i,j)−I(i,j)]2Nj=1
N
i=1
 (29) 
where D(i, j) and I(i, j) represent the reconstructed image and the plain image, respectively. And the PSNR 
test result is shown in Table 2. The experimental data illustrates the PSNR values of the images are all about 
30dB which demonstrates the reconstructed images can be well recognized through the CES architecture. 
Table 2. PSNR values of different images after reconstruction. 
Original 
Image(512×512) 
Compressed and 
encrypted image 
Decrypted 
image 
PSNR(dB) 
 
 
 
34.5560 
 
 
 
34.6995 
 
 
 
31.5132 
 
 
 
37.2577 
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29.2165 
Besides, structural similarity index (SSIM) is an index of the similarity between two images [66] and 
human visual system (HSV) mainly obtains structural information from visible regions. Thus, the approximate 
information of image distortion can be perceived by detecting whether the structural information has any 
changes. Usually, mean SSIM (MSSIM) index is used to estimate the quality of the reconstructed images, and 
it is described by 
 {
MSSIM(𝑋, 𝑌) =
1
𝑊
∑ SSIM(𝑋𝑝, 𝑌𝑝)
𝑊
𝑝=1
SSIM(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝐿(X, Y) × 𝐶(X, Y) × 𝑆(X, Y)
 (30) 
where 𝑊 = 64, 𝐿(𝑋, 𝑌) =
2𝑢𝑋𝑢𝑌+𝐶1
𝑢𝑋
2+𝑢𝑌
2+𝐶1
 , 𝐶(X, Y) =
2𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌+𝐶2
𝜎𝑋
2+𝜎𝑌
2+𝐶2
 , and 𝑆(X, Y) =
𝜎𝑋𝑌+𝐶3
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌+𝐶3
 in which 𝑋 and 𝑌 are 
the pixel sequences of the original image and the reconstructed image, 𝑢𝑋 and 𝑢𝑌 are the mean values of 𝑋 
and 𝑌, 𝜎𝑋 and 𝜎𝑌 are the standard deviations of 𝑋 and 𝑌, 𝜎𝑋
2 and 𝜎𝑌
2 represent the variances of 𝑋 and 
𝑌 , 𝜎𝑋𝑌 is the covariance of 𝑋 and 𝑌 . Besides, 𝐶1 , 𝐶2 and 𝐶3 are the constants in order to avoid the 
denominator equalling to 0, that is, 𝐶1 = (𝐾1 × 𝐿)
2, 𝐶2 = (𝐾2 × 𝐿)
2, 𝐶3 =
𝐶2
2
, 𝐾1 = 0.01, 𝐾2 = 0.03, and 
𝐿 = 255. 
Generally, when the MSSIM value is close to 0, it illustrates the reconstructed image is hugely different 
from the original image, otherwise, it indicates the reconstructed image is very similar to the plaintext when 
the MSSIM value approximates to 1. The experimental results when the CR is 0.5 is shown in Table 3, which 
shows that the MSSIM values of different test images (512×512) are all very close to 1, and the MSSIM 
values of this work for Lena image and Pepper image are larger than that of [65]. Therefore, it can be seen the 
compression ability of the proposed scheme is good for different images and the volume of transferred data 
can be well reduced.  
Table 3. The MSSIM values of the algorithms with CR=0.5. 
Original image 
(512×512) 
Algorithms MSSIM 
 
Proposed algorithm 0.9995 
In [65] 0.9964 
23 
 
 
Proposed algorithm 0.9991 
In [65] N/A 
 
Proposed algorithm 0.9994 
In [65] 0.9727 
 
Proposed algorithm 0.9992 
In [65] N/A 
 
Proposed algorithm 0.9996 
In [65] N/A 
4.4 Performance evaluation of proposed measurement matrix 
 The performance evaluation is tested by comparing the recovered results of the proposed measurement 
matrix with the same algorithm using other random measurement matrices including Gaussian matrix, 
Bernoulli matrix and Toeplitz matrix. PSNR value is treated as the evaluation criterion to describe the 
reconstruction performance in detail. In this paper, five different images “Lena”, “Cameraman”, “Peppers”, 
“House” and “Lake” with the size of 512×512 are used as the test images, and the CR is 0.5. Compressive 
sensing is applied on the encoding process of the proposed scheme with the above four measurement matrices. 
After that, the reconstructed images are obtained by doing decoding operation with the respective 
measurement matrix. As shown in Fig. 10, the proposed measurement matric generated by Lissajous map 
presents similar PSNR value compared to that of Gaussian matrix, Bernoulli matrix and Toeplitz matrix. 
Therefore, the test results prove that the measurement matrix of this work owns good performance and 
effectiveness in compressive sensing. Simultaneously, it has no negative effect on image reconstruction. 
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Fig. 10. PSNR values of the reconstruction results using different measurement matrices. 
4.5 Correlation coefficient analysis 
 Natural image always has strong correlation (commonly close to 1) among pixels. However, the 
correlation of encrypted image is expected to be close to 0, which means the association between pixels is 
greatly eliminated. The correlation coefficient could be obtained by 
 𝐶 =
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥)(𝑦𝑖−𝑦)
𝑁
𝑖=1
√(∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 )(∑ (𝑦𝑖−𝑦)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 )
, (31) 
where 𝑥 = (1/𝑁)∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑦 = (1/𝑁)∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 .  
Table 4 gives the correlation coefficients between adjacent pixels of both the cipher and original image 
(256×256) in three directions (horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions), respectively. The pixels in natural 
images are strongly correlated to each other and correlation coefficients tend to be larger than 0.85. But the 
cipher image owns weak correlation between the neighbouring pixels and correlation coefficients almost equal 
to 0 commonly. Compared with the algorithms in [51], [52][67], the cryptosystem in this work obtains better 
performance from the data shown in Table 4. Besides, Fig. 11 also shows the correlation between pixels of 
plain-text is very strong but that of the corresponding encrypted image is really weak. Therefore, it 
demonstrates that attackers cannot get effective information by using the statistical attack due to the weak 
correlation of cipher image. 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients of adjacent pixels of the proposed method and other algorithms. 
Algorithm Image (256×256) Horizontal Vertical Diagonal 
 Original Lena 0.9250 0.8856 0.8526 
Proposed algorithm Encrypted Lena 0.0069 -0.0028 -0.0047 
In [51]  0.0846 0.0583 0.0931 
In [52]  0.0104 0.0299 0.0062 
In [67]  0.0442 0.0382 0.0631 
 Original Cameraman 0.9488 0.9129 0.8820 
Proposed algorithm Encrypted Cameraman -0.0044 -0.0054 0.0025 
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In [51]  0.0639 0.0539 0.0848 
In [52]  N/A N/A N/A 
In [67]  N/A N/A N/A 
 Original Peppers 0.9520 0.9436 0.9160 
Proposed algorithm Encrypted Peppers 0.0074 0.0035 0.0041 
In [51]  0.0787 0.0582 0.0873 
In [52]  0.0385 0.0296 0.0069 
In [67]  0.0387 0.0182 0.0473 
 Original House 0.9475 0.9719 0.9263 
Proposed algorithm Encrypted House -0.0065 0.0072 -0.0044 
In [51]  N/A N/A N/A 
In [52]  N/A N/A N/A 
In [67]  N/A N/A N/A 
 Original Lake 0.9264 0.9325 0.8936 
Proposed algorithm Encrypted Lake -0.0084 -0.0028 0.0033 
In [51]  N/A N/A N/A 
In [52]  N/A N/A N/A 
In [67]  0.0239 0.0134 0.0448 
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Fig. 11. Correlation distribution of the original images and the corresponding cipher images in the horizontal direction. 
(a) original “Lena”, (b) encrypted “Lena”, (c) original “Cameraman”, (d) encrypted “Cameraman”, (e) original 
“Peppers”, (f) encrypted “Peppers”, (g) original “House”, (h) encrypted “House”, (i) original “Lake”, and (j) 
encrypted “Lake”. 
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4.6 Key space analysis 
 Large key space can prevent the attackers from getting the correct keys and improve the ability of resisting 
the common attack such as brute-force attack. The key space can be assessed by using mean absolute error 
(MAE), which is given by 
 MAE(γ, 𝛾′) =
1
𝑀×𝑁
∑ |𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾𝑖
′|𝑀×𝑁𝐼=1 , (32) 
where 𝛾𝑖  and 𝛾𝑖
′  represent the sequences generated by initial values 𝑥01  and 𝑥01 + Δ 
(Δ is the key deviation), length of 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖
′ are both 𝑀 ×𝑁. 1/Δ0 is the key space of 𝑥0, where Δ0 is 
one of the value Δ that satisfies MAE(γ, 𝛾′) = 0. In this CES, the space of secret key 𝑥01 is 10
15. Similarly, 
𝑥02, 𝑥03, 𝑥04, 𝑎01, 𝑎02, 𝑎03, 𝑎04  have the same key space as 𝑥01. Thus the whole key space of the 8 parameters 
is about 10120, which is larger than 2360. And the subspace of 𝑥05 equals to 10
12 as well as the 𝑦01, 𝑦02 
and 𝑦03. In summary, the total key space of this CES is 2
360 + 2144 which is much larger than that in the 
[51][68]–[71] from the data shown in Table 5. Therefore, the proposed algorithm owns a large key space and 
can be fairly effective against the exhaustive searching and brute-force attack. 
Table 5. Key space comparison with other algorithms. 
Algorithm Proposed In [51] In [68] In [69] In [70] In [71] 
Key space 2360 + 2144 1034 2276 1056 2149 1060 
4.7 Key-sensitivity analysis 
 A secure cryptosystem should own good key sensitivity, i.e. a tiny variation in secret key should cause 
dramatic changes in the cipher image. To illustrate the difference between plaintext image and decrypted 
image with different keys, the key sensitivity is evaluated by the mean square error (MSE) and it can be 
defined by 
 MSE =
1
𝑀×𝑁
∑ [𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) − 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗)]2𝑖,𝑗 , (33) 
where 𝑀 ×𝑁 is the size of the image, I and D denote the plain image and decrypted image. Fig. 12 displays 
the restored “Lena” by wrong keys where each time only one key with a tiny deviation and the others remain 
unchanged, i.e., Fig. 12(a)-(l) represent the decrypted “Lena” by the incorrect keys with a little change 
(10−13~10−14 ). From Fig. 12, it can be concluded that the plaintext image is covered up even if a tiny 
deviation happens to the keys. Fig. 13 displays the MSE curve for all the keys with tiny deviations. It is 
obvious that the MSE value is very large when one key for the decryption process has a tiny deviation and the 
others remain unchanged. However, the MSE value is quite small if all the correct keys are given. Accordingly, 
the proposed CES owns quite high sensitivity to the secret keys which makes the attackers hardly obtain the 
useful information by the brute force. 
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Fig. 12. Decrypted “Lena” using incorrect keys with the changes of (a) 𝑥01 + 10
−14, (b) 𝑎01 + 14, (c) 𝑥02 + 10
−14, 
(d) 𝑎02 + 10
−14, (e) 𝑥03 + 10
−14, (f) 𝑎03 + 10
−14, (g) 𝑥04 + 10
−14, (h) 𝑥05 + 10
−13, (i) 𝑎04 + 10
−14, (j) 𝑦01 +
10−13, (k) 𝑦02 + 10
−13 and (l) 𝑦03 + 10
−13. 
 
Fig. 13. MSE curves. (a) 𝑥01, (b) 𝑎01, (c) 𝑥02, (d) 𝑎02, (e) 𝑥03, (f) 𝑎03, (g) 𝑥04, (h) 𝑥05, (i) 𝑎04, (j) 𝑦01, (k) 𝑦02 
and (l) 𝑦03. 
4.8 Known/Chosen plaintext attack 
 Known/chosen plaintext attack is commonly used to get the useful information of the original image. 
Therefore, some effective procedures are implemented to resist known/chosen plaintext attack. Specifically, 
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the low frequency partial coefficient 𝐿𝐿 is sensitive to the initial parameters 𝑦01, 𝑦02, 𝑦03, which serve as the 
keys for Chua’s circuit which is used to confuse the 𝐿𝐿 subband. In the proposed algorithm, 𝑦01, 𝑦02, 𝑦03 
are produced by using SHA-256 hash function according to the plain image, so a tiny change in the original 
image may bring completely different keys. Hence, the 𝐿𝐿 subband which contains the main information of 
one image is prevented from known/chosen plaintext attack. In addition, the detail components 𝐿𝐻, 𝐻𝐿 and 
𝐻𝐻 have a strong relationship with control value 𝑥05, which is also generated by SHA-256 hash function. 
Besides, 𝑥05 is used to iterate the Lissajous map to form the CADRMM, and the measurement matrices 
𝚽𝑳𝑯_𝑯𝑯 for 𝐿𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻 subband, and 𝚽𝑯𝑳 for 𝐻𝐿 subband will all vary according to the original image. 
Accordingly, the 𝐿𝐻 , 𝐻𝐿  and 𝐻𝐻  subband are also robust against known/chosen plaintext attack. 
Furthermore, the correlation between algorithm and the plaintext are improved. Without the correct diffusion 
matrix and measurement matrix, the attackers cannot obtain the original image by known/chosen plaintext 
attack. 
4.9 Occlusion-attack analysis 
 The occlusion-attack may occur during transmission due to network breakdown, i.e., part of the encrypted 
image may be lost in transmission [72]. Robustness of CES is determined by whether the useful information 
can be restored correctly. The robustness is tested by dropping some information in different directions from 
the encrypted results. In this paper, the encrypted image (Fig. 6(b)) suffered the occlusion attack from different 
positions with diverse sizes. As shown in Fig. 14, Fig. 14(a1)-(a3) illustrate 1/32 data (64×64) of the encrypted 
image in left corner, middle and right corner is lost respectively, and the reconstructed images are displayed 
in Fig. 14(a4)-(a6). Analogously, the encrypted image with data loss of 1/16 data (64× 128), 1/8 data 
(128×128), 1/4 data (128×256) and 1/2 data (256×256) in three different positions are shown in Fig. 14(b1)-
(b3), Fig. 14(c1)-(c3), Fig. 14(d1)-(d3) and Fig. 14(e1)-(e3). The corresponding recovered images are 
indicated in Fig. 14(b4)-(b6), Fig. 14(c4)-(c6), Fig. 14(d4)-(d6) and Fig. 14(e4)-(e6), respectively. It can be 
obtained that the restored image becomes blurred as the amount of data loss increases. However, the outline 
of the image can still be identified even if half of the image is lost. 
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Fig. 14. The decrypted results of the encrypted image suffering from occlusion attack. 
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 Moreover, PSNR value is another index to evaluate the performance of occlusion attack. Table 6  
illustrates that the PSNR is around 23.5804dB in three different positions when the size of data is 1/32. With 
the increase of information loss, the PSNR values gradually decline. When the half of the encrypted image is 
lost, the PSNR comes down to 12.0534dB in average. 
Therefore, the proposed algorithm is capable of resisting serious occlusion-attack analysis. Accordingly, 
the robustness of the image in real time transmission channel can also be guaranteed. 
Table 6. PSNR between the recovered images and the plain images with occlusion attack of different position and 
size. 
Position and size 
Left corner 
PSNR(dB) 
Middle area 
PSNR(dB) 
Right corner 
PSNR(dB) 
Average PSNR(dB) 
1/2 data loss 12.0874 12.0520 12.0209 12.0534 
1/4 data loss 14.9623 14.8832 14.9057 14.9170 
1/8 data loss 17.8726 17.8270 17.8443 17.8479 
1/16 data loss 20.7884 20.6804 20.6902 20.7196 
1/32 data loss 23.5937 23.6092 23.5384 23.5804 
4.10 Noise attack analysis 
 During the transmission, images can be contaminated by different kinds of noises. Salt & Pepper 
noise(SPN), Gaussian noise(GN) and Speckle noise(SN) are three typical common noises in transmission [73]. 
So the noises are added to the cipher, and the ability of the proposed algorithm is evaluated according to the 
recovered images. In this paper, the noise level is set between 0.000001 and 0.000007. Fig. 15(a)-(d) show 
the encrypted images (Fig. 6(b)) with Salt & Pepper noise intensity equals to 0.000001, 0.000003, 0.000005 
and 0.000007, respectively. The corresponding decryption images are shown in Fig. 15(e)-(h). Similarly, the 
reconstructed images under Gaussian noise and Speckle noise are displayed in Fig. 16(e)-(h) and Fig. 17(e)-
(h). It can be seen that the extent of damage becomes more serious with the increase of noise intensity. 
However, the reconstructed images can still be recognized clearly, even if the noise intensity is 0.000007. 
 
Fig. 15. The reconstructed images under Salt & Pepper noise attack with different noise intensities. 
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Fig. 16. The reconstructed images under Gaussian noise attack with different noise intensities. 
 
Fig. 17. The reconstructed images under Speckle noise attack with different noise intensities. 
 Moreover, the PSNRs of the reconstructed images for the plain image Lena in the case of different noise 
are fully illustrated in Table 7. Among the three kinds of noise, Gaussian noise has the greatest impact on 
restored images and the PSNRs change from 33.85dB to 29.46dB when the noise intensity varies from 
0.000001 to 0.000007. Besides, the PSNRs of the Salt & Pepper noise stay at around 34.48dB with different 
intensities and it shows there is the excellent ability to resist Salt & Pepper noise for the proposed scheme. 
Besides, the PSNRs are limited in the range of [31.82dB, 34.49dB] when suffered from Speckle noise which 
illustrates there is little negative effect on the restored images for Speckle noise. In addition, Fig. 18 shows 
the more detailed changing trend of PSNRs between the recovered image and original image under three noise 
attacks in this work and Fig. 19 displays the trend in [65]. Compared with the decrypted results in [65], this 
proposed scheme has relatively higher PSNRs under the same conditions which demonstrates the proposed 
encryption algorithm has good robustness against different kinds of noise attacks under different intensities. 
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Table 7. Comparison with other algorithm under different noise. 
Noise Algorithm Noise intensity PSNR(dB) 
SPN 
 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000001 
34.49 
In [65] 31.05 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000003 
34.49 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000005 
34.48 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000007 
34.47 
In [65] 27.93 
GN 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000001 
33.85 
In [65] 30.10 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000003 
30.85 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000005 
30.07 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000007 
29.46 
In [65] 25.39 
SN 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000001 
34.49 
In [65] 31.05 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000003 
33.70 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000005 
32.87 
In [65] N/A 
Proposed algorithm 
0.000007 
31.82 
In [65] 30.99 
 
 
Fig. 18. PSNR between the recovered image and original image under three noise attacks. 
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Fig. 19. PSNR under three noise attacks in [65]. 
4.11 Time analysis 
 Time consumption is another important criterion to test the performance of an encryption algorithm, and 
it is also considered in this work. Specifically, the encryption process includes five main operations: diffusion 
matrix generation, LL subband diffusion, measurement matrix generation, measurement process and matrix 
combination distribution. The corresponding time test distribution for the Lena (256×256) under the condition 
of CR=0.5 is shown in Fig 20, which illustrates 0.389459s is required to complete the whole encryption. 
Besides, it can be seen that the process of diffusion matrix generation occupies the most time in the whole 
encryption procedure, i.e., it takes around 53.15%. Meanwhile, the encrypted speed for different images is 
experimented and tested, and the results are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. From Table 8, it can be seen the 
encryption time for the images with the size of 256×256 is around 0.4s and that of the images with size of 
512×512 is around 1.2s. In addition, the corresponding decryption time is experimented and listed in Table 
10 and Table 11. Similarly, the decryption time for the images with 256×256 is about 0.9s and that of images 
with 512×512 is about 6.7s. Because in the decryption process, the measurement matrix is needed and it 
greatly related with the size of image. So, a larger image usually needs a larger measurement matrix to 
reconstruct to consume more time. 
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Fig 20. Total encryption time and time consumption percentage of each part in the algorithm for Lena (256×256). 
Table 8. Encryption speed of the test images with the size of 256×256 (s). 
Image (256×256) Lena Cameraman Peppers House Lake Baboon 
Proposed algorithm 0.3895 0.3960 0.3987 0.3946 0.3924 0.4296 
Table 9. Encryption speed of the test images with the size of 512×512 (s). 
Image (512×512) Lena Cameraman Peppers House Lake Baboon 
Proposed algorithm 1.1843 1.1926 1.1801 1.1894 1.1706 1.1715 
Table 10. Decryption speed of the test images with the size of 256×256 (s). 
Image (256×256) Lena Cameraman Peppers House Lake Baboon 
Proposed algorithm 0.8751 0.9710 0.9254 0.9262 0.9041 0.9544 
Table 11. Decryption speed of the test images with the size of 512×512 (s). 
Image (512×512) Lena Cameraman Peppers House Lake Baboon 
Proposed algorithm 6.6910 6.7360 6.6234 6.8272 6.7743 6.7308 
 To compare the effectiveness of this work, the execution time is compared with other related encryption 
schemes shown in Table 12 and Table 13. The data in Table 12 shows the proposed scheme has better 
encryption efficiency than that in [65] and [74], and the decryption time consumption of this work is also 
shorter than other reference schemes in Table 13. Thus, the proposed method provides sound security as well 
as low time complexity. 
Table 12. Encryption speed comparison with other algorithms (s). 
Image 
Lena 
(256×256) 
Baboon 
(256×256) 
Peppers 
(256×256) 
Cameraman 
(512×512) 
House 
(512×512) 
Lake 
(512×512) 
Proposed algorithm 0.39 0.43 0.40 1.20 1.19 1.18 
In [65] 0.58 0.47 0.66 N/A N/A N/A 
In [74] 2.25 2.55 2.76 N/A N/A N/A 
Table 13. Decryption speed comparison with other algorithms (s). 
Image Cameraman Lake Baboon Lena House Peppers 
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(256×256) (256×256) (256×256) (512×512) (512×512) (512×512) 
Proposed algorithm 0.98 0.91 0.96 6.70 6.83 6.63 
In [65] N/A N/A 2.09 14.02 N/A 13.41 
In [74] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
5. Conclusion 
 A novel compression-encryption scheme is proposed in this paper, which is based on chaos-combined 
asymptotic deterministic random measurement matrices, Haar wavelet and Chua’s circuit. Specifically, the 
plain image is decomposed into approximate component and detail components through Haar wavelet 
transform beforehand. The wavelet coefficients of the detail components are mapped to 8-bit integer numbers 
before XOR operation, and then a mixed system which combines Chua’s circuit with logistic map and the 
threshold processing of LBP operator-based theory are used to generate mask. In addition, the chaos-combined 
asymptotic deterministic random sequence is used to produce the CADRMM to measure detail components 
in case of different compression ratios and improve scrambling degree. Finally, approximate component and 
detail components are assembled together before scrambling. Due to that the approximate component is 
retained and only the detail components are compressed, the robustness of this CES can be significantly 
improved, i.e., the experimental results demonstrate it still has good robustness even under the strong 
occlusion and noise attacks. In the meantime, the performance and security analysis indicate that the proposed 
scheme has a large key space, high key sensitivity, similar histogram distribution and weak coefficient 
correlation. Therefore the proposed scheme is not only able to reduce the data amount for the image 
transmission but also has a good security performance. 
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